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How different from Dr. Johnson a century before: "There are few ways in which a man can be more innocently employed than in getting money."
Something strange has happened since 1848, worth understanding. The cultural superstructure has contradicted the material base. Daniel Bell wrote in 1976 of the "cultural contradictions of capitalism," a theme in Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy as well.6 Whether an inevitable tendency to contradiction or the autonomous force of ideas and accident explains it, this treason of the clerks, the loss of faith in the bourgeoisie at its hour of triumph, had consequences in politics beyond the economy.
In this (and some other matters) I have changed my mind. I began in economic history arguing contra David Landes that in my mature opinion a culture was insignificant beside technology and tastes. Age 26 in 1968, recently a Marxist and still a most enthusiastic young transportation economist, I was determined to emphasize the material rather than the spiritual, the forces of price and prudence as against what I called sociology, about which it must be said I knew very little.
I take back none of my earlier calculations, which still seem to me pretty. It is still true that Victorian Britain did not fail in steelmaking, that foreign trade is overstated as an engine of British growth, that the gold standard worked through commodity arbitrage not Lombard Street, and that medieval peasants were prudent in their open fields. I have no more patience now than 30 years ago with suppositions that people ignore gigantic opportunities for profit. As a matter of historical fact they do not. Supposing without evidence 3Shaw, "Introduction," p. 334. 4Grafia, Bohemian versus Bourgeois. S Clough, "Latest Decalogue," p. 1034. 6Bell, Cultural Contradictions; and Schumpeter, Capitalism. that they do seems impious towards the glorious dead, treating them in retrospect as idiots. It is even bad sociology. But to explain how markets live, to explain where technology and tastes originate, to explain what symbolic system supported or discouraged the people living in the economies of olden days we need culture, in both the anthropologist's and the aesthete's sense.
A neglected link between the economy and culture is "bourgeois virtue." When I first planned to speak about it, at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, the secretary called me up in Iowa to get the exact title. She laughed. "'Bourgeois virtue'!I That's an oxymoron, isn't it?" Which puts the problem well. It will seem disorienting to talk to economic historians about ethics (not that "ethical economic historian" is an oxymoron!). But I think we are not going to get the economy right until we face the virtues and vices of its people, and we are not going to see the virtues until we face the economy.
We have two ancient ways of talking about the personal virtues, and seem stuck on them. One is patrician, what John Casey calls "pagan" virtues. The classical four are those of Odysseus: prudence, temperance, justice, and courage. The aristocrat is honorable, great hearted in hospitality, quick to anger. "You wine sack, with a dog's eyes, with a deer's heart," says Achilles-exhibiting more courage than prudence, temperance, or justice-"Never/ once have you taken courage in your heart to arm with your people."
The other way of virtue-talk is plebeian, the way of St. Paul. The peasant suffers yet endures. "Owe no man any thing, but to love one another." Faith, hope, and love, these three, but the greatest is love. It is a "slave morality," bending to the aristocratic virtues that Nietzsche and other Hellenizers prized.
The two vocabularies of the virtues are spoken in the Camp and Common. Achilles struts through the Camp in his Hephaestian armor, exercising a noble wrath. Jesus stands barefoot on the mount, preaching to the least of the Commoners.
And yet we live mostly now in the Town, we bourgeois, or else we are moving to townly occupations as fast as we can manage, trading the old cow for a car. The aristocracy is gone, though some intellectuals wish not. And the prediction that the proletariat at the other end would become the universal class has proven to be mistaken.
Jobs for the two older classes are disappearing. The very soldiers in bourgeois democracies are shuffiers of paper. Half of employment in rich countries is white collar and rising. The proletarian production of things has become steadily cheaper, and therefore has taken few people to do it. A barber or a professor was not much more productive in 1990 than in 1800, for that matter in 400 B.C. It still takes 15 minutes with a pair of scissors to do short back and sides and 50 minutes with a piece of chalk to convey the notion of comparative advantage. But the farmer since 1800 has become more productive in the United States by a factor of 36. We cannot eat 36 times more food (though some of us try) and so the farmer's share in employment has fallen towards nil. A piece of cotton cloth that sold for 40 shillings in the 1780s sold in the 1850s for 5 shillings and nowadays, in the same values of money, for a few pence. The cheapness led spinning out of the home, then weaving, canning, men's clothing, women's clothing, food preparation. Stanley Lebergott calculated that food preparation fell in a middle-class house from 44 hours a week in 1944 to 10 hours in 1965.7 Calculating power itself-adding, multiplying, and carrying-that sold for $400 in 1970 sold for $4 in 1990, and pennies now. Workers on the line in American manufacturing peaked at about one-fifth of the labor force after World War II and have since been falling, at first slowly. In 50 years a maker of things on an assembly line will be as rare as a farmer. What is left is hamburger flipping on the one side and bourgeois occupations on the other.
Yet we lack a vocabulary for speaking of the virtues within this encompassing commercial, capitalist, bourgeois society. We insist on measuring temperance, prudence, justice, and courage against the soldier, and faith, hope, and love against the saint. American businessmen speak of their ethical world in sporting terms, one step from the battlefield. Their critics speak in socialist terms, one step from the nunnery. Pagan or Christian, aristocrat or peasant, the ethics we speak suits our condition poorly. We need a discourse of the bourgeois virtues: integrity, honesty, trustworthiness, enterprise, humor, respect, modesty, consideration, responsibility, prudence, thrift, affection, self-possession, prudence. We do not have it in our modem art or literature, or in our scholarship on economic history.
The modem silence is strange because in the eighteenth century the conversation started so well. I regard Hume and Smith, Locke and Montesquieu as articulating an ethical and political vocabulary for a commercial society. Adam Smith's intention was to create an ethical system for the bourgeoisie. Look for example at his very first appearance in print, in 1758, an anonymous encomium to a bourgeois friend: The fallacy in the argument, which has not been spotted by modem economists in its grip, was first noted by David Hume, followed by Smith: "It is the great fallacy of Dr. Mandeville's book to represent every passion as wholly vicious [that is, self-interested, a matter of vanity], which is to any degree and in any direction."10 Thus if I get a little utility from love, it "follows" (say Epicurus, Mandeville, Bentham, and Gary Becker) that love is reducible to utility, and we can abandon any account of separate virtues and vices. But this is silly. I get utility because I love, not the other way around. It does not follow that I love entirely because of utility. I may have gotten some amusement from my children, but I did not have them and love them with aching passion down to this bitter day entirely or even largely because they were amusing. And it is therefore not true that virtues such as love, justice, courage, and so forth can be reduced without remainder to utility.
Smith of course by no means approved of every activity of the bourgeoisie. He was suspicious of the rent-seeking of merchants, noting that in contrast to the landlords and workers, the interests of the bourgeoisie are "always in some respects different from, and even opposite to, that of the publick."1' The "clamour and sophistry of merchants and manufacturers easily persuaded [society] that the private interest of a part, and a subordinate part of the society, is the general interest of the whole."'2 Smith was read this way at the time. Hugh Blair wrote on 3 April 1776 By the time of Smith it was conventional to think of the virtues as the four aristocratic or pagan virtues with the three peasant or theological virtues: courage, temperance, prudence, and justice, with faith, hope, and love. The analysis of all virtues into these seven was begun in classical times and completed by Aquinas, though the weight of the tradition is not a knockdown argument for thinking that the seven contain all the virtues one needs to consider. Smith may have been mistaken to adhere to these only-it may be that a bourgeois virtue is hard to discuss in terms once classical or Christian.
Smith left off Faith and Hope. I think he believed that these two of the theological virtues were inappropriate to a bourgeois society. Eighteenthcentury doers and thinkers were haunted by the religious wars of the previous century, the excesses of Faith. In Britain, especially after the Gordon Riots of 1780, they were haunted, too, by the excesses of Hope. To accept Hobbes's absurd mental experiment as the frame for answering all questions of why societies hang together is a scientific mistake. Like the Voting Paradox, the Hobbes Problem is contradicted by the facts. People do not always cooperate, but neither do they always defect. The life of man is only sometimes a state of Warre. In actual experiments men and women cooperate far above the level predicted by the Solely Prudence model. (A revealing feature of the experiments is that the only people who do not cooperate at such levels, and who do approach the Benthamite economist's level of defection are ... Benthamite economists.) Sic transit all manner of histories of the economy and polity that suppose that all we need to grasp is Prudence.
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What is wrong with ignoring the system of virtues can be put econometrically. Suppose we propose to reduce all behavior, B-buying, borrowing, bequeathing, birthing--to a linear function of Prudence, P, standing for all the variables that economists since Bentham have specialized in loving: Prudence, but also profit, price, payment, property, policy, 19 Baier, "What Do Women Want?", p. 264. 20 Rose, Property and Persuasion, p. 225. purpose, preferences, pain, punishment, the pocketbook, the Profane. We generously admit that, well, yes, there might be other springs of conduct working at the same time, in cases such as voting or the prisoners' dilemma or the raising of children, the S variables of Solidarity, but also society, sociology, sensibility, stories, speech, sanctions, shame, the soul, the spirit, the subconscious, the self, the sacrament, the Sacred. That is, econometrically speaking, we might specify: But the economist is taking an econometric misstep. The estimation of the coefficients is unbiased only if the error term is uncorrelated with the included variable, P. But unless God (bless Her holy name) has arranged the world's experiment such that P and S are independent, orthogonal, unrelated in a statistical sense, the quasi error term yS + e will be correlated with the include variable, P. The coefficient P3, the outcome of an empirical investigation that improperly ignores the S variables, will be biased. The estimate will not even be consistent, statistically speaking: large sample sizes will not make any difference, except to make the economist, by the idiocy of statistical significance, unreasonably confident that he has the explanation in P alone.
In many important cases in economic history-the Voting Paradox in 1856 and the Prisoner's dilemma in commercial trust, to take two, but others also, such as the size of coal cars on British railways around 1900, the coming of general limited liability in England, American welfare reform in the late nineteenth century, the profit from Jamaican slavery during the Industrial Revolution, the govemance of Bengal after 1761, the policies of Andrew Mellon, the balance of power within the bourgeois family, the buying of public symbols such as monuments and sports arenas, the labor bargain in early Manchester, the economic history of the Wisconsin lumber industry, the Old Poor Law, child labor in the nineteenth century, family survival in the Great Depression, the treatment of slaves, American consumer credit in the 1920s, the high school movement in the North around World War I, the segregated labor markets in the South, British overseas investment around 1870, rent seeking in prerevolutionary France-the virtues buried in the error term will be correlated with Prudence positively or negatively. If the correlation is substantively large (forget about its merely statistical significance, which is irrelevant scientifically), then the attempt to get insight in the Prudence variables will be substantively ruined. Not always. Sometimes the forces of P are so large relative to those of the correlated S that the mistake is trivial. Doubtless on the foreign exchanges contemporaneous arbitrage has little to do with S. Prudence reigns. But when we think a complete character might be involved, then failing to acknowledge S explicitly will leave the experiment not properly controlled. What is needed is for economists to incorporate into their analysis, whenever it is pertinent, such basic traits and emotions as the desire for power or sacrifice, the fear of boredom, pleasure in both commitment and unpredictability, the search for meaning and community, and so on.... When one has been groomed as a "scientist" it just takes a great deal of wrestling with oneself before one will admit that moral considerations of human solidarity can effectively interfere with those hieratic, impersonal forces of supply and demand.22
The first thing one groomed to be a "scientist" is going to claim is that the S variables are hard to measure. Economic historians, who have more acquaintance with measurement than the average economist or the average historian, will laugh out loud at such a claim. It is less, not more, difficult to measure gender, family background, education, social class, churches attended, newspapers read, and many, many S variables than the magnitude of labor-saving technical change in the United States, the British cost of living c. 1820 including services, the rent of land in Arthur Young's England, the interest rate in eighteenth-century China, the wage gap between men and women since 1890, and many, many other P variables. _________________so.
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It is easy to see how P depends on S, and many dissertations in economic history could be written making the point in detail. But S also depends on P, and dissertations should be written on that subject, too. Who we are depends on what we do, our ethics depend on our business. Commerce is a teacher of ethics. The growth of the market promotes virtue, sometimes. Most intellectuals since 1848 have thought the opposite: that the market and the ethic of the bourgeoisie always erode virtue. As James Boyd White puts it in his otherwise admirable Justice as Translation, bourgeois growth is bad because it is "the expansion of the exchange system by the conversion of what is outside it into its terms. It is a kind of steam shovel chewing away at the natural and social world."23 White is here stuck back with Dickens in Hard Times: "It was a fundamental principle of the Gradgrind philosophy," wrote, "that everything was to be paid for. . . . Gratitude was to be abolished, and the virtues springing from it were not to be. Every inch of the existence of mankind, from birth to death, was to be a bargain across a counter."24 On the contrary, the virtues of the bourgeois are those necessary for town life, for commerce and self-government. The virtue of tolerance, for example, can be viewed as bourgeois. Its correlations in European history, such as between Spain and Holland, suggest so. The experience of uncertainty in trade creates a skepticism about certitude--the arrogant and theoretical certitude of the aristocrat or the humble and routine certitude of the peasant. As Arjo Klamer has pointed out, "the dogma of doubt" is bourgeois, an attitude suited to the vagaries of the marketplace. On the town hall of Gouda in the Netherlands is inscribed the bourgeois motto, "Audite et alteram partem," "Listen even to the other side."
Bourgeois charity, again, if not the "charity," meaning love, of the English bibles, runs contrary to the caricature of greed. More than the peasant or aristocrat the bourgeois gives to the poor-as in the ghettos of Eastern Europe or in the small towns of the United States. Acts of charity follow the bourgeois norm of reciprocity. Jonathan Israel points out that 1616 the city of Amsterdam helped support over 10 percent of its population from the public purse.25 The American Gospel of Wealth, founding hospitals, colleges, and libraries wherever little fortunes were made, is a bourgeois notion, paying back what was taken in profit. Walter Annenberg gives $500 million to schools in one jolt and we are not astonished. Middle-class people in the nineteenth century habitually gave a biblical tenth of their incomes to charity. The intrusion of the state into charity deadened the impulse, remaking charity into a taille imposed on grumbling peasants: I gave at the office.
The market spreads American habits of cooperation with strangers. In the United States, noted Santayana, "co-operation is taken for granted, as something that no one would be so mean or short-sighted as to refuse," and it is "private interests which are the factors in any co-operation." He does not here mean that Prudence Alone makes for cooperation: "When interests are fully articulated and fixed, co-operation is a sort of mathematical problem," in the manner of Hobbes; but Santayana saw much more arising from "a balance of faculties."26 Above all the causal connection between P and S in the bourgeois society is a matter of rhetoric. (There: I've used the R word!) A source of bourgeois virtue and a check on bourgeois vice is the premium that a bourgeois society puts on discourse. The bourgeois must talk. The aristocrat gives a speech, the peasant tells a tale. But the bourgeois must in the bulk of his transactions talk to an equal. It is wrong to imagine, as modem economics does, that the 25 Israel, Dutch Republic, p. 360. The population of Amsterdam was about 100,000 at the time (p. 328). Israel quotes R. B. Evenhuis as giving a figure of 2,500 families, about 10,000 souls, which is where Israel gets his 10 percent. He reckons that an equal number were "supported" by churchs and guilds, which would mean that inhabitants "receiving charitable assistance from one source or another" were 20 percent of Amsterdam's population, not 10 percent.
26 Santayana, Character, pp. 196, 226, 223, 222. market is a field of silence. "I will buy with you, sell with you, talk with you, walk with you, and so following.... What news on the Rialto?" The aristocrat does not deign to bargain. Hector tries, and Achilles answers: "argue me no agreements. I cannot forgive you.! As there are no trustworthy oaths between men and lions,/ Nor wolves and lambs have spirit that can be brought into agreement." The Duke of Ferrara speaks of his last, late duchess there upon the wall, "Even had you skill/ In speech--(which I have not)--to make your will/ Quite clear to such an one .... / -E'en then would be some stooping; and I choose/ Never to stoop." The aristocrat never stoops; the peasant stoops silently to harvest the grain or to run the machine; the bourgeois stoops metaphorically to make his will quite clear, and to know the will and reason of the other. The aristocrat's speech is declamation, and his proofs are like commands, which is perhaps why Plato the aristocrat and some Western intellectuals after him loved them so. The proof of the irrationality of the square root of 2 convinces (vincere, to conquer). The bourgeois by contrast must persuade, sweetly ("suadeo," from the same root as English "sweet").
The bourgeois goes at persuasion with a will. About a quarter of national income nowadays in rich countries is earned from merely bourgeois and feminine persuasion: not orders or information but persuasion.27 One thinks of advertising, but in fact advertising is a tiny part of the total, one-and-ahalf percent of national income. Take The world of the bourgeoisie is jammed with institutions for making relationships and declaring character, from credit bureaus to business schools. The aristocracy and the peasantry got their characters ready-made by status, and in any case did not need to persuade. Tom Buddenbrook bitterly scolds his unbusinesslike brother, a harbinger of bohemianism in the family: "In a company consisting of business as well as professional men, you make the remark, for everyone to hear, that, when one really considers it, every businessman is a swindler--you, a business man yourself, belonging to a firm that strains every nerve and muscle to preserve its perfect integrity and spotless reputation."32
The bourgeoisie works with its mouth, and depends on word of mouth. Tom most enjoys "trade he came by through his own personal efforts. Sometimes, entirely by accident, perhaps on a walk with the family, he would go into a mill for a chat with the miller, who would feel himself much honoured by the visit; and quite en passant, in the best of moods, he could conclude a good bargain."33 The firm's motto, challenged in the nineteenth century by Greed and Art, is, "My son, attend with zeal to thy business by day, but do none that hinders thee from they sleep at night."34 Doing well by talking well, and doing therefore good.
A change is overdue. To admire bourgeois virtue is not to admire greed. Capitalism needs encouragement, being the hope for the poor of the world and being in any case the practice of what we were and who we are. But capitalism need not be hedonistic or monadic, and certainly not unethical. An aristocratic, country-club capitalism, well satisfied with itself, or a peasant, grasping capitalism, hating itself, are both lacking virtue. And neither works in town. They lead to monopoly and economic failure, alienation and revolution. We need a capitalism that nurtures communities of good townsfolk, in South Central Los Angeles as much as in Iowa City. We encourage it by taking seriously the bourgeois virtues. 32 A myth of recency has made the virtues arising from towns seem those of a shameful parvenu, such as Franklin and the United States. In economic history dependent on Marx, such as Weber's General Economic History or Karl Polanyi's The Great Transformation, the market is seen as a novelty. "Market economy," claimed Polanyi on little evidence, "is an institutional structure which, as we all too easily forget, has been present at no time except our own."35 From this historical mistake arose the fairytales of lost paradises for aristocrats or peasants, and a reason for ignoring the bourgeois virtues.
It has taken a century of professional history to correct the mistake. The late David Herlihy put it this way in 1971: "research has all but wiped from the ledgers the supposed gulf once considered fundamental, between a medieval manorial economy and the capitalism of the modem period."36 Medieval men bought and sold everything from grain to bishoprics. The Vikings were traders, too. Greece and Rome were business empires. The city of Jericho dates to 8000 B.C. The emerging truth is that we have lived in a world market for centuries, a market run by the bourgeoisie. Time to recognize the fact-to study a bourgeois virtue, and recognize its tangled history of P and S.
Polanyi, Great Transformation, p. 37. 36 Herlihy, "the Economy of Traditional Europe," p. 155.
